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Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many? 
  Daniel Watts 
 
This paper reexamines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether 
truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and 
subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-
coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ 
[Fordoblelse], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither 
one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. I further show how 
these points shed much-needed light on the relationship between objective and 
subjective truth, conceived not as different kinds or species of truth but as different 
ways in which truth manifests itself as a standard of success across different 
contexts of inquiry. 
 
 Kierkegaard’s writings entertain a view according to which truth divides into two: 
the objective and the subjective. So much is close to the limit of what can be said without 
controversy about Kierkegaard on truth. Some deny he meant seriously to advance any 
claims at all about truth. And among those who think he intended a serious distinction 
between kinds of truth, there is little consensus about how these kinds are to be 
distinguished and how they are related. In this paper, I propose to reexamine Kierkegaard’s 
ideas about truth with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. That he 
sharply distinguishes subjective from objective truth may seem to place him directly, and 
squarely, in the camp that is nowadays called ‘alethic pluralism’. I shall argue that this 
impression is misleading. Kierkegaard’s work, I want to show, cuts across debates between 
monists and pluralists about truth in cogent and interesting ways.  
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 My plan is as follows. I shall begin by providing a close reading of the opening 
paragraphs of the chapter on truth in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (hereafter, 
‘Postscript’). My claim shall be that this passage presents an argument for the following 
conditional: if it is to be conceived substantively, then truth needs to be conceived in a 
certain, unitary way: viz. truth as self-coincidence. I shall characterize truth as self-
coincidence as Kierkegaard’s core conception of truth; a conception in which the primary 
candidates for truth are agents, rather than propositions, and which therefore admits an 
important role for adverbial uses of the so-called truth predicate. By explaining his use in 
this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [Fordoblelse], I shall show how Kierkegaard can 
intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a 
complex multiplicity.  
In §§ 2 and 3, I shall turn to the division between objective and subjective truth and 
explain why I think it is a mistake to construe this distinction, in sortal terms, as one among 
kinds or species of truth. On the proposal I want to develop, this distinction holds, rather, 
between ways in which truth manifests itself as a standard of success in different contexts 
of inquiry. Objectivity, I shall argue, is the way Kierkegaard thinks truth as self-coincidence 
manifests itself as a norm of empirical inquiry. On this account, aiming for truth in empirical 
inquiry means trying, so far as possible, to sustain a disinterested perspective on objects in 
the world, attending only to ‘what is there’. Subjectivity, by contrast, is the way 
Kierkegaard thinks truth manifests itself as a norm of ethical inquiry, broadly construed. On 
this account, what it is to seek truth in contexts of ethical inquiry is to strive for what I shall 
call ‘agent’s-awareness’; that is, to try to fully occupy the first-person perspective of 
practical agency. Here the aim is to coincide with oneself qua practical agent, through the 
process Kierkegaard calls ‘appropriation’. 
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I hope in this way to show that objective and subjective truth are not, for 
Kierkegaard, different kinds of truth but, rather, different ways in which truth manifests 
itself as a standard of success across different contexts of inquiry. Two important 
corollaries of the view I shall defend are that, contrary to a common impression, by 
‘objective truth’, Kierkegaard does not mean the set of true propositions (or some member 
thereof); and that, contrary to another common impression, ‘subjective truth’ has nothing 
especially to do with sincerity, nor any other propositional attitude. 
 
1. Truth as self-coincidence: Kierkegaard’s core conception of truth 
 
Expositors of Kierkegaard on truth are naturally drawn to the corpus of 
Kierkegaard’s fictional philosopher, Johannes Climacus, and especially to Section Two, 
Chapter 2, of Concluding Unscientific Postscript; ‘Subjective truth, inwardness; truth is 
subjectivity’ (Kierkegaard 1992, p. 189). Critics also tend to skate (or skip) over the opening 
paragraphs of this chapter, which comprise some compressed remarks of a very general 
sort about truth. But Climacus’ opening remarks are in my view of first importance, not 
least if we are to properly assess his claim that what he calls subjective truth is, precisely, a 
matter of truth. Accordingly, my first aim is to work out a closer reading of the first six 
paragraphs of this chapter of Postscript.   
 These paragraphs culminate in an enigmatic definition of truth, according to which 
truth is ‘in an entirely abstract sense a redoubling which is nevertheless cancelled at the 
very same moment’ (Kierkegaard 1992, p. 190). How, then, does Climacus arrive at this 
perplexing definition? He argues, in outline, as follows:  
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1) Truth is standardly defined as the agreement of thought with being (‘the empirical 
definition’) or as the agreement of being with thought (‘the idealist definition’). 
2) If ‘being’ in these formulas means empirical being then the concept of truth is empty, 
since thought can never perfectly agree with the empirical reality from which it 
abstracts.  
3) But if ‘being’ means abstract being then the contrast between the two formulas 
collapses: nothing can count as bringing thought into agreement with being, nor being 
with thought, since, abstractly conceived, ‘thought and being mean one and the same, 
and the agreement in question is a mere abstract self-identity’ (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 
160).  
 
Therefore, if the concept of truth is substantive, then, on either of the standard 
definitions, truth is merely the ‘self-identity’ of thought and being. 
 
What is striking about this overall line of argument is the way it presses the standard 
definitions of truth towards empty tautology. Any hint of the idea of correspondence in the 
term ‘agreement’, for example, is hollowed out as Climacus reduces the traditional 
formulas to the statement, as he puts it, that ‘truth is, with the accent here on the copula – 
truth is’ (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 160).1 Climacus’ argument here closely tracks one of the 
sources of Frege’s dissatisfaction with any correspondence theory of truth: 
 
                                       
1 Plausibly, Schelling is in the background of Kierkegaard’s ‘emphasis on the copula’. For a discussion of 
Schelling on truth and the copula, see Thomas 2014.  
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A correspondence, moreover, can only be perfect if the corresponding things coincide 
and so are just not different things. … It would only be possible to compare an idea with 
a thing if the thing were an idea too. And then, if the first did correspond perfectly with 
the second, they would coincide. But this is not at all what people intend when they 
define truth as the correspondence of an idea with something real. For in this case it is 
essential precisely that the reality shall be distinct from the idea. But then there can be 
no complete correspondence, no complete truth. So nothing at all would be true; for 
what is only half true is untrue. Truth does not admit of more and less. (Frege 1977 
[1918], p. 3) 
 
Now, some idealists are prepared to bite Frege’s bullet. Thus, Bradley affirmed that nothing 
is completely true save the Whole Truth About Everything; nonetheless, he thought, 
common-or-garden judgements are partially true.2 But Climacus closes down this route. 
Like Frege, he assumes that propositional truth is absolute; thoughts can’t be partially true. 
For he argues - as per 2 above - that it follows from the (Bradleyan) premise that it is of the 
nature of thought to abstract from empirical reality that, if truth implies the strict 
coincidence of thought and empirical reality, the most truth could amount to is an 
unattainable desideratum. From this standpoint, a position like Bradley’s collapses into a 
kind of eliminativism about truth.3 If truth is to be given a substantive interpretation, in line 
                                       
2 Cf. Haak 2005, p. 89 
3 That his so-called identity theory of truth ultimately turns out to be eliminativist is already suggested by 
Bradley’s famous talk of a ‘happy suicide’ of thought. As Candlish and Damnjanovic observe: ‘[t]alk of an 
identity theory of truth … is ultimately misleading in application to Bradley, since his theory ends up as 
eliminativist: on his anti-Hegelian view, reality transcends the rational and turns out not to have a fact-like 
structure expressible in any propositional form at all, so that when full truth is attained, the point of 
inexpressibility is reached. Thus Bradley, despite using the word ‘identity’ to describe his view, says as well 
that ‘in the proper sense of thought, thought and fact are not the same’ and talked of the attainment of 
truth in terms of thought’s ‘happy suicide’’ (Candlish & Damnjanovic 2007: 240).  
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with the standard definitions, Climacus thinks we shall need to think in terms of an identity, 
not between thought and empirical reality but, rather, between thought and abstract being. 
But that way, he thinks, leads inexorably to the collapse of any genuine contrast between 
the realist (‘empirical’) and the idealist definitions of truth.    
Climacus’ thinking here – as per 3 above – can be reconstructed as follows. There 
can be a genuine contrast between the two traditional definitions only if thought and being 
can stand in a relationship of priority, one way or the other. On the realist’s formula, it is 
being that is supposed to have the priority. The pursuit of truth, accordingly, is the aim to 
bring our representations into conformity with the ways things are. On the idealist’s 
definition, by contrast, the priority is given to thought. Here, the pursuit of truth is the aim 
to render being intelligible in the form of a coherent system of thought. But now comes the 
difficulty. For if we conceive of being in an abstract enough way, so that it can truly coincide 
with thought, then neither of these priorities is coherent. To illustrate: suppose we conceive 
of thought, in abstracto, as the ways the world is intelligibly said or thought to be. And 
suppose we conceive of being, in abstracto, as the world as it is intelligibly said or thought 
to be. Then clearly there can be no question of a relation of priority here, since now, as 
Climacus observes, ‘thought and being mean one and the same’ (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 160); 
indeed, for this reason, there can be no question of a relation at all. After all, we could refer 
to the concept of the ways the world is intelligibly said or thought to be by a single term: 
Heraclitus’ ‘logos’, perhaps, or McDowell’s ‘thinkables’.4 But then the contrast between the 
two formulas collapses and we are left with the mere idea of an identity of thought and 
being. 
                                       
4 For McDowell’s own version of an identity theory of truth, which makes reference to ‘thinkables’, see 
McDowell 2005. 
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Climacus concludes on this basis that, if the traditional formulas point to a 
substantive definition of truth, this must be that truth is the identity of thought and 
abstract being. What, then, does it mean to define truth in this way? As we have indicated, 
Climacus quickly goes on to give this definition a surprising gloss, in terms of the idea of a 
‘redoubling’ or ’duplication’ [Fordoblelse]. It is here that Climacus’ exposition is at its most 
perplexing. But, as I hope to show, it is also just at this point that he offers a distinctive 
general account of the nature of truth. The crucial passage is this:  
 
But if being is understood in this way [sc. not as empirical being but abstractly], the 
formula [sc. that truth is the agreement of thought with being] is a tautology; that is, 
thought and being mean one and the same, and the agreement in question is merely an 
abstract self-identity. So neither formula [sc. neither the ‘empirical’ nor the ‘idealist’ 
definitions of truth] says more than that truth is, with the accent here on the copula: 
truth is, i.e., truth is twofold [‘truth is a redoubling’]. Truth is the first, but truth’s second, 
that it is, is the same as the first; this latter, its being, is truth’s abstract form. This is a 
way of saying that truth is not something simple but in an entirely abstract sense a 
duplication which, however, is in the same instant cancelled [‘truth is a redoubling, 
which is nevertheless cancelled at the very same moment’]. (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 160) 5 
 
Climacus’ first emphasis here is on the uninformative character of the traditional definitions 
of truth. And he is in general wont to complain that, because they never really get beyond 
tautology, philosophical discussions of truth all too quickly become sterile. However, this 
                                       
5 The alternative translations, given in square brackets, are the Hongs’ (Kierkegaard 1992, p. 190). 
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note of impatience with efforts to define truth is evidently far from the whole story about 
Climacus. For, he appears to have in mind a quite particular conception of what it means to 
define truth as the identity of thought and being; one from which he thinks it follows that 
truth is ‘not something simple’ but is, rather, a ‘redoubling’ or ‘duplication’ [Fordoblelse].6 
We can gain traction on this difficult train of thought, I suggest, if we associate the 
idea of the self-identity of thought and being with the concept of God. (Note that, 
according to Climacus’ argument, this is plainly not to conceive of the divine mind, in 
panentheistic fashion, as identical with empirical reality). This suggestion is in fact directly 
supported by the text: Climacus goes on to remark that the self-identity of thought and 
being is actual, ‘in the case of God’ (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 160). Further, indirect, support is 
provided by a journal entry in which Kierkegaard moots a rather abstract definition of God 
as ‘infinite redoubling’.7 On Kierkegaard’s understanding, there is within divine agency an 
in-built duality, between God’s self-awareness and God’s being, notwithstanding their 
perfect agreement. And this, I take it is, is what Climacus has in mind, too, when, using the 
idea of divine agency as the paradigm, he avers that truth is a ‘redoubling, which is 
nevertheless cancelled in the very same moment’. 
I therefore propose the following interpretation of Climacus’ enigmatic gloss on the 
traditional definitions of truth. He holds that, if it is to be genuinely substantive, the 
concept of truth must apply, paradigmatically, to a certain form of agency. This is, namely, 
a form of agency that satisfies two conditions: (i) it must exhibit the duality of self-relation; 
and (ii) it must remain in agreement with itself, being in no wise self-estranged. A form of 
                                       
6 On antecedents of Kierkegaard’s conception of truth as redoubling in Fichte, see Kangas 2007, p. 80. 
7 Kierkegaard writes: ‘[God] has not an element of objectivity in his being … but God relates himself 
objectively to his own subjectivity, but this again is simply a redoubling of his subjectivity … God is 
infinite redoubling’ (Kierkegaard 1976, 4571 / XI 2 A 97). 
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agency that perfectly satisfied both of these conditions would be neither a simple unity, 
since it would exhibit the duality of self-relation, nor a complex multiplicity, since it would 
also exhibit perfect self-coincidence. It is in this sense that truth is said, no doubt 
picturesquely, to continually bifurcate only to immediately collapse back into itself. More 
prosaically, we can say that what Climacus is working out here is a conception of truth as 
self-coincidence. On Kierkegaard’s understanding, God is the very archetype of truth as self-
coincidence. Divine agency is Truth itself; there is in God no opacity, duplicity or shadow of 
turning: ‘I am that I am’ (Exodus 3:14). (Compare Shakespeare’s Iago: ‘I am not what I am’ 
(Othello, Act I, Scene I, line 66)). 
How, then, does Climacus get from the idea of an identity of thought and being to 
these ideas of redoubling and divine agency? What is doing the work here, I suggest, is his 
aim to salvage something from the idea of agreement in the traditional definitions of truth. 
As we have seen, Climacus thinks the idea of agreement cannot be cashed out in either of 
the ways envisaged by realists and idealists. Nonetheless, he thinks we can still attach 
genuine significance to the idea of truth as agreement if we conceive of truth, not merely as 
an immediate identity or unity – the unity of the intelligible structure of reality, say – but 
rather as a reflexive form of agreement, a form of self-identity in which reality coincides 
with itself. And he thinks that, if anything perfectly exemplifies a reflexive form of 
agreement, this is divine agency. 
Now, Climacus is in a hurry to move on to the question of what, since we are not 
God, truth as self-coincidence could possibly mean for finite beings like us. As we shall see 
(in §2 below), it is precisely in response to this question that he introduces his distinction 
between objective and subjective truth. But let me pause to draw out three features of the 
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core conception of truth that I think we may plausibly associate with Kierkegaard, viz. truth 
as self-coincidence. 
Firstly, this conception plainly relies on there being candidates for truth other than 
judgements, statements or propositions. Kierkegaard apparently thinks the primary truth-
bearers are agents: paradigmatically, God. Now, from the perspective of contemporary 
philosophy of language, at least, the idea of non-propositional candidates for truth must no 
doubt seem strange and suspicious. In Kierkegaard’s own milieu, however, Hegel had 
clearly articulated a view in which truth is not solely, nor even primarily, a matter of the 
correctness of judgements:   
 
Truth is at first taken to mean that I know how something is. This is truth, however, only 
in reference to consciousness; it is formal truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper 
sense consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion [Begriff]. It is in this 
deeper sense of truth that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art. The objects 
are true, if they are as they ought to be, i.e. if their reality conforms to their notion. 
(Hegel 1975, p. 276) 
 
As Robert Stern has noted, Hegel here anticipates Heidegger’s contrast between 
propositional and material truth (Stern 1993, p. 645ff). Under the material conception, ‘true’ 
is a noun-qualifier, where for some X and for some F, X is a true F; as when we speak of a 
true friend who shows true grit.8 Heidegger’s favourite example is ‘true gold’, in contrast 
                                       
8 Cf. Barnes 2011, p. 95.  
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with the bogus stuff that merely passes itself off as gold.9 Crucially, however, while such 
examples may help to bring into view the general idea of a material (or ‘objectual’) use of 
term ‘true’, it is plausibly only in a derivative sense that inanimate stuff like gold and iron 
pyrite can be called ‘true’ and ’false’. At any rate, Kierkegaard, for his part, clearly conceives 
of the archetype of material truth, rather, as the self-coinciding agent. (Indeed, it is 
plausible that when we say e.g. that pyrite ‘passes itself off’ as gold we are metaphorically 
extending a notion of agency to the pyrite; and we say ‘fool’s gold’ as well as ‘false gold’.10) 
Does Kierkegaard then at all allow for propositional truth? I shall not attempt here a 
full answer to this important question and it has to be admitted that he says little to 
address it. However, the following points are preliminary to an answer. First, there is in 
Climacus’ discussion no hint of an attempt to reduce the truth-conditions of judgements to 
justification or assertability-conditions. On the contrary, he refers to tokens of the 
statement that the earth is round, for instance, as straightforwardly true. Second, it may be 
open to Kierkegaard to hold, along the lines of Aristotle’s so-called theory of focal 
meaning, that, while truth as self-coincidence captures its focal meaning, truth can 
nonetheless be said in many ways.11 Accordingly, he may hold that propositions are 
                                       
9 Thus, Heidegger: ‘the word ‘true’ is ambiguous … used of things (true gold) and of sentences (true 
propositions), whereby the prevailing view is that ‘true’ and ‘truth’ apply in the first place and originally to 
propositions’ (Heidegger 2002, p. 86).  
10 Because of the way it ties truth to agency, Kierkegaard’s non-propositional view is notably immune to 
certain familiar objections to Heidegger’s own non-propositional account of truth as the ‘being-
uncovered’ of an entity. For a classic critique of Heidegger on this score, see Tugendhat 1993.  
11 Kierkegaard’s view of truth has antecedents in scholastic discussions of the place of truth in the doctrine 
of transcendentals: viz. the theory of that which, being expressed in everything, cannot be tied to genera, 
species or created individuals. In this tradition, truth, no less than Aristotle’s being, can be said in many 
ways but cannot be carved up into kinds. With reference to Albert the Great, Jan Aetsen summarizes the 
trend of scholastic thought in this regard: ‘Albert’s strategy in his reply [to Aristotle] consists in 
emphasizing the multiplicity of the term ‘true’: it is said in many ways (multipliciter dictur). He makes a 
distinction between a general (ontological) sense of truth and a special (logical) sense: “Truth” can signify 
a general disposition of being or a composition of terms in the intellect. This distinction is typical of the 
medieval reception of the Aristotelian conception of truth and is also invoked by Duns Scotus in his 
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properly said to be the kind of thing that can be true or false in a way that is secondary with 
respect to the way agents can coincide or fail to coincide with themselves. And third, we 
should note that Kierkegaard may hold that there is nothing much to be said about the 
nature of propositional truth. If anything, Climacus’ emphasis on the tautological character 
of the traditional definitions supports a view of propositional truth that is modest if not 
deflationary.12 Indeed, by the argument outlined above, if propositional truth is all there is 
to truth then, properly thought through, the traditional definitions lead to empty 
tautology.13 
A second feature of truth as self-coincidence is the way it construes the so-called 
truth predicate. As we have just emphasized, Kierkegaard’s view admits of agents as 
candidates for truth, with respect to the ways they exercise their agency.14 Accordingly, I 
think it best fits with his view to construe the so-called truth predicate as most 
fundamentally playing an adverbial role. On this account, an agent is ‘in the truth’ – or, as 
we may also put it, she comports herself truly – just to the extent to which she exercises her 
agency in a self-coinciding way. Conversely, you are ‘in untruth’ – you comport yourself 
untruly – just to the extent to which you are characterized by self-division, duplicity, self-
estrangement.  
                                                                                                                       
Metaphysics commentary. Truth, he observes, is two-fold: there is not only truth in the intellect but also in 
things’ (Aertsen 2012, pp. 65-66). See also n. 20 below. 
12 Compare, e. g., Wolfgang Künne’s ‘modest, or quantificational account’ of truth (Künne 2008), which 
develops Wittgenstein’s formula: ‘what he says is true = things are as he says’ (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 123).  
13 Note also in this connection that Climacus’ argument is conditional on two undischarged assumptions: 
that (i) the traditional definitions point, albeit inadequately, to something important about truth; and that 
(ii) truth can be given a substantive interpretation.  
14 Because it does not conceive of propositions as the primary bearers of truth, Kierkegaard’s view 
escapes the problem, faced by identity theory of truth of the propositional sort, of seeming to need to 
posit false states of affairs that are identical with false judgements.    
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A third feature of truth as self-coincidence is that it admits of degrees. Again, this is 
not to say that Climacus countenances degrees of propositional truth. He is not, I think, 
vulnerable to the charge, sometimes leveled against Bradley, of inferring fallaciously from 
‘p is only part of the truth’ to ‘p is only partially true’.15 Rather, the relevant idea is that the 
degree to which a given agent is ‘in the truth’ – the degree to which she comports herself 
truly – is the degree to which she self-coincides in the exercise of her agency: the less self-
estrangement, the more truth. Criteria for judging how far an agent’s conduct self-
coincides will vary according to context of assessment, as I shall argue below.   
So does Kierkegaard think truth is one or many? So far, we have seen that Postscript 
articulates a unitary, substantive account of truth: truth as self-coincidence. This already 
sets Kierkegaard apart from any form of alethic pluralism that rejects the very possibility of 
a unitary, substantive definition of truth. However, we have also seen that, according to 
truth as self-coincidence, truth itself is neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. It 
follows from the reflexivity built into the idea of self-coincidence that truth is not a simple 
unity: for, it is of the nature of truth to double back on itself, bifurcating into subject and 
object. On the other hand, it follows from the idea of self-coincidence that no duplicity or 
two-sidedness is established by the duality of the self-relating agent. There is therefore an 
intelligible way for Kierkegaard to maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a 
simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. In a slogan: truth is dual without being double.16  
What remains to be seen is how we are to understand the relationship between 
truth as self-coincidence and Kierkegaard’s division between objective and subjective truth. 
In turning to this issue, my aim now is to show how these two ‘kinds’ of truth are not really 
                                       
15 For an instance of this criticism of Bradley, see Haack 2005, p. 100. 
16 Thanks to David McNeill, who suggested this formulation to me. 
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kinds at all; rather, they are different ways in which truth manifests itself as a standard of 
success across different contexts of inquiry. It is also part of my aim to begin to spell out 
what ‘self-coincidence’ might mean in these contexts. 
 
2. Objective truth as a manifestation of truth as self-coincidence 
 
 Kierkegaard is often said to have held that there are two kinds of truth. Thus, in her 
recent book, Ways of Knowing: Kierkegaard’s Pluralist Epistemology, M. G. Piety declares 
that ‘Kierkegaard was clearly aware … that his views supported the view that there were 
two kinds of truth’ (Piety 2010, p. 48). Likewise, Arnold B. Come sums up as follows a view 
of Kierkegaard that is orthodox to the point of being platitudinous:  
 
According to Kierkegaard, human thinking works in two different ways … He calls them 
‘objective reflection’ and ‘subjective reflection.’ Each produces a different kind of ‘truth’, 
both of which are valid and useful within certain limits. (Come 1995, p. 85)17 
 
Come’s shudder-quotes around ‘truth’ seem to betray some uneasiness on his part with the 
idea that there might really be different kinds of truth. But did Kierkegaard really think that 
there are? One thing that should immediately give us pause is simply that the language of 
‘kinds’, ‘species’, ‘types’, ‘sorts’, or even ‘modes’ or ‘forms’ of truth is nowhere to be found 
in, for example, the chapter on truth in Postscript. Instead, Climacus writes there, with 
respect to his contrast between two general contexts of thinking and inquiry, of truth’s 
                                       
17 Examples are readily multiplied. Unguarded references to Kierkegaard’s division between objectivity 
and subjectivity as a distinction among kinds or sorts of truth include Pojman 1984, p. 73; Solomon 1987, 
p. 77; Rae 1997, p. 146; Walsh 1997, p. 272. 
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becoming different, across the two contexts. So we should ask whether there might not be 
some significance in these striking locutions about truth’s ways of ‘becoming’.18 
 How, then, does Kierkegaard distinguish between objective and subjective truth? In 
Postscript, the distinction makes its entry as follows: 
 
When the question of truth is raised by an existing spirit, qua existing, that abstract 
duplication recurs. But existence itself, existence in the questioner, who does indeed 
exist, holds the two factors apart, and reflection marks out the two relations. For 
objective reflection the truth becomes something objective, an object, and the thing is 
to disregard the subject. For subjective reflection the truth becomes appropriation, 
inwardness, subjectivity, and the thing is precisely, in existing, to deepen oneself in 
subjectivity. (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 161) 
 
As befits the way in which the idea of agency enters into his core view of truth, what 
Climacus means by ‘the question of truth’ here is evidently the question: what does it mean 
for beings like us to exemplify truth? Above all, he wants to combat any tendency we may 
have in this regard to confuse ourselves with God. We finite subjects cannot exemplify truth 
in the way God does. To be sure, as agents or ‘spirits’ we, too, are characterized by the 
duality of self-relation. That we exist within a nexus of historical and empirical becoming, 
                                       
18 A further reason to pause is historical. Through his close readings of Baader on Eckhart and Baur on 
Scotus, Kierkegaard was no doubt familiar with scholastic discussion of truth as transcendental, i.e. 
transcategorical. Thus, Eckhart can write: ‘Those properties which are God’s own are Being or being, 
Unity, Truth, Goodness. For God has these four transcendental as properties in as much as <God> is 
‘the first’, which is ‘rich in itself’. God has these because the rich in itself has that which is proper to itself’ 
(cited in Hackett 2013, p. 188). On the Eckhartian provenance of Kierkegaard’s conception of divine 
‘redoubling’, see Kangas 1998. 
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however, is itself sufficient to ‘hold apart the two factors’ – viz. thought and being – so that, 
for us, the pressing question is how the two can be brought together.  
It is by way of an answer to this question that Climacus distinguishes two 
corresponding ‘paths’ of reflection and inquiry. The one path takes up the task of making 
manifest the empirical world. This way leads to natural science, to ‘abstract thinking, to 
mathematics, to historical knowledge of various kinds’ (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 163). The 
other path takes up the task of trying to become manifest to oneself qua self-relating 
agent. This way leads to ‘appropriation’ and to ethical and religious forms of self-
understanding in the context of inquiry into the human good. Now, in my view, these two 
contexts of inquiry are by no means supposed to ‘produce two kinds of ‘truth’’. I hope to 
show that, on the contrary, Climacus thinks that a single idea of truth – truth as self-
coincidence – manifests itself in different ways as a norm of inquiry in these two contexts.  
Consider first the case of ‘objective truth’. Climacus says that, from the perspective 
of objective reflection, ‘truth becomes something objective, an object’ (Kierkegaard 2009, 
p. 161). In empirical inquiry, the goal is to achieve impersonal knowledge of objects in the 
world, knowledge of ‘what is there’ [Tilvaerende]. Negatively put, the goal is to purify one’s 
perspective from any distortion or restriction that arises from any special interest one may 
have in one’s own existence.19 Climacus is quick to point out that there is something 
ultimately paradoxical about this goal, inasmuch as it leads ‘at its maximum’ to ‘a 
contradiction’ (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 163), viz. the idea of a perspective-free perspective, a 
‘view from nowhere’ in Nagel’s famous phrase. As situated, finite beings we can, Climacus 
                                       
19 Cf. Tacitus’ pledge to relate history sine ira et studio, without passion or partiality. Cf. also Nicholas 
Rescher on the ideal of objectivity: ‘We try, in short, to free what we maintain from our personal 
idiosyncrasies: from biases, idiosyncrasies, predilections, personal allegiances, and the like’ (Rescher 1997, 
p. 6). 
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insists, only ever approximate to a purely objective perspective. But he is also at some pains 
to emphasize that attending solely to ‘what is there’, so far as is humanly possible, is an 
important part of what it means for beings like us to seriously pursue the truth. 
Now, one might naturally complain that the ideal of objectivity has nothing 
especially to do with self-coincidence and so a fortiori cannot be the way truth as self-
coincidence manifests itself as a norm of empirical inquiry. We can make sense of Climacus’ 
view, however, if we allow that part of what it is to aim for objectivity is in general to try to 
sustain a certain stance towards oneself, qua object among objects in the empirical world. 
In Climacus’ terms, the required stance is one of disinterestedness. Recall in this connection, 
for example, Bacon’s doctrine of the idols of the mind:  
 
For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams 
of things should reflect according to their true incidence, nay, it is rather like an 
enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. 
For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed on us by the 
general nature of the mind. (Bacon 2011 [1861], p. 276) 
 
In this passage, Bacon is clearly thinking of himself in a quite particular way, as an object 
among objects, part of the causal nexus. In short, he exemplifies the type of self-awareness 
Kant called empirical. No doubt Bacon has his own (empiricist) view of what objectivity and 
disinterestedness ultimately involves; one whose details we should not ascribe to 
Kierkegaard. Nonetheless, it is clear that, in Climacus’ view also, aiming for objective truth 
quite generally means striving to sustain the third-person perspective of empirical self-
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consciousness: regarding one’s own reality, as it were, from the point of view of the 
universe.  
 In what sense, then, does objectivity manifest an ideal of self-coincidence? Consider 
a case of scientific misconduct of a familiar sort. A paper in The Lancet in 1998 purported to 
establish a link between the MMR vaccine and autism. It subsequently emerged that twelve 
of the children in the study were recruited via a UK lawyer preparing a lawsuit against MMR 
manufacturers and, moreover, that one of its authors received a large sum in undisclosed 
fees two years prior to publication. It is plausible, to say the least, that this conflict of 
interest vitiated this author’s posture of objectivity: his personal investment meant that he 
failed to coincide with himself merely qua object among objects in the empirical world. He 
became self-divided, double-minded, duplicitous. In the title phrase of a classic work on 
scientific fraud, he took his place among the ‘betrayers of the truth’ (Broad & Wade 1982). 
Still, it might be objected that the pursuit of objective truth involves trying to 
achieve self-coincidence, if it involves this at all, only as means to end. Is not the goal of 
such inquiry simply to state truths about the world? Now, if we have in mind specific 
domains of research – the investigation of black holes, say, or the history of twelfth century 
heresy – I do not think Climacus means to deny that the proximal goal of such research is 
just to find out more about black holes or heretics. What he denies, rather, is that the 
human pursuit of objective truth can in general be reduced to the aim to utter correct 
statements about the world. As his parable about the truth-telling lunatic helps to show – in 
which a man escaped from the asylum tries to prove his sanity by periodically blurting out 
that the earth is round - the mere aim to utter truths about the world is compatible with all 
sorts of madness (Kierkegaard 2009, pp. 163-4).  
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It is also salutary that the claim that objectivity is how truth as self-coincidence 
manifests itself as a norm of empirical inquiry is not the claim that the ideal of self-
coincidence must enter into the minds of empirical inquirers as their explicit guide and goal. 
Climacus’ idea is not, implausibly, that if you ask a natural scientist or historian what they 
are aiming for they will likely tell you they are aiming to self-coincide. On the contrary, his 
account predicts they will say they are aiming for objective truth. For the claim is, precisely, 
that it is in the form of objectivity that truth manifests itself as a standard of success within 
these contexts of inquiry.  
So Climacus may with some plausibility conceive of objective truth as the distinctive 
way that truth as self-coincidence manifests itself as a norm of empirical inquiry. In this 
arena, we can say that, for Climacus, an inquirer is ‘in the truth’ – she comports herself truly 
– just to the (limited) extent to which, in whatever particular researches she undertakes, 
she is able to sustain a disinterested point of view on the objects of her research. Notably, 
Climacus is even given to present the kind of self-transformation this involves as a kind of 
spiritual exercise, a ‘dying to self’ by detaching from any special interest one may have in 
one’s own existence, concentrating one’s attention solely on ‘what is there’.20  
If this interpretation is right, it follows that by ‘objective truth’ Climacus does not 
mean propositional truth. He means, rather, the way truth as self-coincidence manifests 
itself as a norm of objective inquiry. Accordingly, with regard to his undeniable stress on 
the limits of objectivity, we need to keep separate the following two claims: 
 
A. It is impossible for abstract thought to perfectly coincide with empirical reality. 
                                       
20 Cf. Simone Weil’s conception of what is required by ‘attention’: ‘suspending our thought, leaving it 
detached, empty and ready to be penetrated by the object’ (Weil 2010, p. 35). 
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B. It is impossible for human beings to fully realize the goal of objective truth. 
 
We have seen that Climacus endorses both of these claims, A and B. But, as we have also 
seen, Climacus is not Bradley: he does not infer from A that the propositional contents of 
our judgements can only ever be partially true. Rather, he concludes that truth is not 
merely propositional. And it is on the basis of his fundamentally non-propositional 
conception of truth – truth as self-coincidence – that he further concludes that (B) it is 
impossible for us to fully exemplify objective truth qua way of being human.  
These points give the lie to a more common picture of Kierkegaard on truth. On this 
picture, his idea of ‘objective truth’ is more or less straightforward: it is simply the idea of 
(some member of) the set of true propositions. But, on this picture, Kierkegaard is like 
Bradley: he thinks we finite thinkers can only ever grasp partial truths about the reality 
from which it is of the nature of our thoughts to abstract. The more distinctive – for many, 
wildly implausible – part of his view is then the idea that there is a quite different species of 
truth, called ‘subjective truth’, which has something to do with the subject’s attitude 
towards her reflectively endorsed beliefs, whether she holds these beliefs sincerely enough, 
perhaps, or with enough gusto. But we have seen that Kierkegaard’s idea of ‘objective 
truth’ is not equivalent to the idea of true propositions. On the contrary, he works with a 
different conception of objective truth, as a standard of inquiry in which inquirers 
approximate to the ideal of a perfectly disinterested view on empirical reality, not least 
their own.  
In what follows, I hope to make it plausible that Kierkegaard conceives of subjective 
truth, not as a different kind or species of truth, but as a different way that truth as self-
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coincidence can manifest itself as a norm of inquiry. If I am right, ‘subjective truth’ has 
nothing especially to do with sincere belief, nor any other propositional attitude.  
 
3. Subjective truth as a manifestation of truth as self-coincidence 
 
We have seen that Climacus thinks it is not for us to manifest the perfect self-
coincidence of divine ‘redoubling’. And we have seen that he thinks one way for us to take 
up the pursuit of truth is through objective inquiry, where the aim is to take up a 
disinterested perspective on empirical reality. But this is not all. For, Climacus’ emphasis is 
famously on a different way for us to take up the pursuit of truth, which he describes 
variously as ‘subjective thinking’, ‘subjective reflection’ and ‘double-reflection’. Why, then, 
is the idea of objectivity inadequate to specify what it means for finite beings like us to 
pursue truth?  
Plausibly, Climacus’ discussion turns at this point on the following thesis: 
 
(Objective Opacity): Relating to oneself merely as an object among objects is itself a 
form of self-estrangement. 
 
At the heart of Climacus’ thought is the idea that human beings are not just numerically 
distinct objects in the world but self-relating agents, ineluctably characterized by a first-
person perspective and confronted by the issue how to live. We are not God; but we 
nonetheless share in the duality of subjectivity and self-relation. Accordingly, Objective 
Opacity implies that human subjectivity is not exhausted by empirical self-consciousness. 
On a familiar, Kantian line of argument, human subjectivity cannot be exhausted by 
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empirical self-consciousness since the standpoint of practical agency cannot be objectified. 
But I shall not try to defend Objective Opacity here. Rather, my aim in the rest of this essay 
is to make it initially plausible that ‘subjective truth’ is the way Kierkegaard thinks self-
coincidence manifests itself as a norm of ethical inquiry, broadly conceived; that is, in the 
context of questions about the human good and how to live. 
As we have noted, Postscript introduces ‘subjective truth’ as what truth ‘becomes’, 
from the perspective of a certain sort of thinking and inquiry. For subjective reflection, 
‘truth becomes appropriation’. And, as he goes on to make clear, subjective reflection is the 
‘path’ of inquiry Climacus deems appropriate to contexts of what he calls ‘ethical and 
ethico-religious knowing’ (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 166). So his basic claim is that aiming for 
truth, with respect to ethical and religious questions, means aiming for ‘appropriation’. Any 
adequate interpretation of Climacus on subjective truth therefore needs to explain how he 
thinks ‘appropriation’ can furnish a standard of success for ethical inquiry; one, moreover, 
that is robust enough to constitute a norm of truth. In working towards an interpretation 
that meets this basic condition of adequacy, let me first identify two approaches that I think 
signally fail to meet it.  
On one approach, appropriation is a qualification of the propositional attitude of 
belief, closely related if not identical to sincerity. Roughly, the idea is that I ‘appropriate’ the 
belief that p just in case I am sincere or unreserved in my belief that p.21 But the obvious 
rejoinder is that the mere injunction to be sincere is far too weak to be a standard of ethical 
truth: one need only mention ‘the sincere Nazi’.22 And two textual points tell decisively 
                                       
21 Thus, Louis Pojman: ‘We see, then, that this concept of subjectivity has to do with a relationship to 
one’s beliefs’ (Pojman 1983, p. 67) 
22 Cf. Evans 1998, p. 171ff. 
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against the only-be-sincere reading of Kierkegaard. For one thing, to make sincerity either 
necessary or sufficient for subjective truth sits uneasily with Climacus’ central appeal to 
Socrates, as a paradigm of both existential irony and subjective truth. But further, in his 
‘Conclusion’, Climacus explicitly distinguishes his own conception of ‘appropriation’ from 
any mere idea of strong commitment to a doctrine. As Climacus rightly observes, if what 
we mean by ‘appropriation’ is just this – a person’s sincere, unswerving commitment to a 
given doctrine – then one mode of appropriation can only be distinguished from another by 
reference to the doctrines themselves: as he says, ‘one must again resort to the ‘what’, 
which is the doctrine’ (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 512). By contrast, Climacus contends that what 
he calls ‘the pathos of appropriation’ is radically dissociable from propositions, theses, 
doctrines and the like (idem). 
On a second inadequate approach, appropriation means: putting into practice. 
Accordingly, I ‘appropriate’ the belief that p just in case I put the belief that p into practice 
and ‘live it out’. Now, it is certainly part of Climacus’ view that, in ethical inquiry, one’s 
attention needs to be directed not only towards theoretical issues regarding what to think 
about the human good but also, and with the sharper focus, on how one is actually living. 
But, again, it appears that the mere injunction to practice what you preach cannot play the 
role of a standard of truth. For much surely depends on what you preach. It is hardly 
charitable to ascribe to Climacus the view that a preacher of self-deception, for example, 
turns out to be a paradigm of ‘subjective truth’, just so far as he or she manages to actually 
live out a self-deceived life.  
The idea that Kierkegaard thinks sincere conviction is sufficient for a ‘kind’ of truth 
has led many critics to worry about the threats of subjectivism and relativism. But these 
worries, I submit, stem from our tendency to impose on him an alien framework in which 
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the only notions relevant to the analysis of truth are those of mental content, beliefs, 
propositional attitudes and the like. On the alternative proposal I want to canvass, 
‘appropriation’ is best understood as the way Kierkegaard thinks self-coincidence manifests 
itself as a standard of success in ethical inquiry. Specifically, I think we may ascribe to him 
the view that aiming for truth in ethical contexts means measuring oneself against what we 
might call ‘the agent’s-awareness test’: to what extent do you properly occupy the first-
person perspective of practical agency? On this proposal, how well you score against the 
agent’s-awareness test, with respect to a given ethical question, is the extent to which you 
exemplify subjective truth with respect to that question.23  
A full development of this proposal is beyond the scope of this essay. But we can 
begin to spell it out with reference to Climacus’ notorious thought-experiment involving 
two people praying. The crux is this: 
 
If someone living in the midst of Christianity enters the house of God, the house of the 
true God, knowing the true conception of God, and now prays but prays untruly, and if 
someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion of the infinite, 
although his eyes rest upon the image of an idol – where then is there more truth? The 
one prays truly to God though he worships an idol; the other prays untruly to the true 
God, and therefore truly worships an idol. (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 169) 
 
Hannay’s translation nicely brings out the centrality of adverbial modifiers in the contrast 
on which this passage hinges: between one who prays untruly and one who prays truly. 
What makes the difference, I submit, is that the pagan prays in a way that actively takes up 
                                       
23 I borrow the term ‘agent’s-awareness’ from Lucy O’Brien; see her fine analysis in O’Brien 2007.  
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the first-person perspective of practical agency. His is not the disinterested stance of 
empirical self-awareness we illustrated above by reference to Bacon on scientific method. 
Rather, his is the non-objectifying self-awareness of a finite agent with an ‘infinite’ – that is, 
absolute, non-relativized, unqualified – interest in his own existence. What distinguishes 
the true worshipper is that his praying matters to him in an unqualified way. The truly 
praying pagan, as Climacus envisages him, appropriates his received religious practice by 
praying in a way that is closely aligned with his first-person perspective qua practical agent. 
In short, he scores well against the agent’s-awareness test. 
Now, it is built into Climacus’ thought-experiment that the pagan’s praying is 
untrue, by the standards of objective truth, since he mistakenly thinks that in praying to 
God, he is praying to his idol. So are we to take it that a person can exemplify subjective 
truth despite being wholly out of touch with reality? If what we mean by ‘reality’ is 
whatever can be grasped objectively then it is indeed Climacus’ radical view that one can 
exemplify subjective truth while being out of touch with reality. But we need to step 
carefully here. Climacus plainly does not think you can exemplify subjective truth if you are 
out of touch with your own reality as a practical agent. The putative problem with the 
deluded Christian is precisely that, under an illusion of truly praying, he has lost touch with 
his own reality as a practical agent. Again, everything turns here on the thesis that agent’s-
awareness is suis generis, irreducible to any form of objective awareness, including 
empirical self-consciousness. As per Objective Opacity, it is because he takes up a 
disengaged, third-personal stance towards himself that the putative Christian fails to self-
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coincide.24 (We may add that, for Climacus, it is by viewing God merely objectively, as an 
object among objects, that the Christian winds up praying to an idol.)   
If this interpretation is right, the critical question becomes whether agent’s-
awareness is sufficiently robust to constitute a standard of ethical truth. A full treatment of 
this question would need to engage Kierkegaard’s general views of the nature of ethical 
knowledge and of the demandingness of agent’s-awareness. We would need to take into 
account, for example, his view that fully-fledged agent’s-awareness demands Socratic 
interrogation of one’s ethical acculturation and a lived understanding of one’s practical 
possibilities and necessities.25 But these are topics for another occasion. All I hope to have 
shown in this regard is that agent’s-awareness is at least more credible qua norm of truth in 
ethical inquiry than the endeavour to be sincere or to practice what you preach, whatever 
that happens to be.  
My main aim, however, has been to show that Kierkegaard’s division between 
objective and subjective truth holds not between different kinds of truth but between 
different ways in which truth manifests itself as a standard of success in different contexts 
of inquiry. Let me conclude, then, by explicitly addressing the question: what is the relevant 
notion of ‘manifestation’ in the claim that truth manifests itself differently in different 
contexts of inquiry? How exactly are we to understand Climacus’ talk of truth’s various ways 
of ‘becoming’?   
                                       
24 In the terms of Jonathan Lear’s account of Kierkegaardian irony, the putative Christian betrays the 
aspirations implicit in his own pretense of praying (see Lear 2011, p. 11ff). 
25 Thus, it is in the context of a discussion of what constitutes a genuinely ethical form of understanding, 
for example, that in Works of Love Kierkegaard appeals to the famous example of Luther who ‘could do 
no other’ (see Kierkegaard 1995, p. 78). 
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 One way to try to model the relationship between truth and its manifestations is the 
relationship between a determinable feature and its determinates. We have learned from 
W. E. Johnson that crimson and scarlet are not kinds of red but determinates of the 
determinable feature of redness (Johnson 1921). So, on the model of the way redness 
manifests itself in crimson, scarlet, vermillion and so on, but cannot be defined merely as 
the disjunctive property of being one or another shade of red, we might try to conceive of 
truth as determined in different ways in different domains, where the nature of truth itself 
is such as to transcend its range of determinates. We might then gloss Climacus’ account of 
the contrast between objective and subjective truth by saying that, in this view, objectivity 
and appropriation are determinates of the determinable feature of self-coincidence. On 
this proposal, objectivity and appropriation manifest truth in something like the way 
crimson and scarlet manifest redness. 
Notably, contemporary advocates of alethic pluralism have been drawn to the 
determinable/determinate distinction in trying to model the relationship between ‘truth-
conferring properties’ and truth itself.26 It has recently been argued that this way of 
construing truth-conferral will not work, however, because of what might be called the 
Exclusion Problem. As Crispin Wright frames the issue: 
 
When you really do have an instance of the determinate-determinable relation, the 
different determinates under the same determinable compete in the same conceptual 
space: they exclude each other. An object cannot be both crimson and vermilion; the 
                                       
26 See Lynch 2011, p. 75ff. 
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determinates are alternative modes of the determinable: they crowd each other out. 
(Wright 2013, p. 141) 
 
The Exclusion Problem emerges as a problem for Wright because the sort of alethic 
pluralism he advocates entails that, in a given domain of discourse, a proposition can 
simultaneously exemplify not only properties that confer truth within that domain but also 
ones that, while they do not confer truth within that domain, would do so in other domains. 
For Wright, therefore, by contrast with the case of scarlet and crimson as determinates of 
red, the properties that confer truth cannot be mutually exclusive.  
  Is the Exclusion Problem a problem for Kierkegaard? Plainly not in exactly the way it 
is for Wright, given the divergence between Wright’s propositional conception of truth and 
Kierkegaard’s material conception. But the issue merits further consideration. It amounts 
to the question whether Kierkegaard thinks an agent can simultaneously exemplify both 
objectivity and appropriation. There is a strong case that Climacus, at any rate, holds that 
objectivity and appropriation do indeed crowd each other out; for, he strongly emphasizes 
the way in which the paths of objective and subjective reflection ‘branch off’ and diverge 
(Kierkegaard 2009, p. 169). The source of this emphasis is not hard to find: it reflects 
Climacus’ insistence on the basic asymmetry between the disinterested perspective of 
empirical self-consciousness and the ‘infinitely interested’ perspective of practical agency. 
Against this, it might be objected that Climacus cannot regard objectivity and 
appropriation as mutually exclusive because of the way he conceives of appropriation in 
terms of ‘double-reflection’. For, the idea of double-reflection, as a certain way of thinking 
and inquiry, appears to involve the idea of a thinker who takes up both the third-person 
perspective of objective inquiry and also the first-person person perspective of practical 
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agency. Certainly, the idea of doubly-reflected inquiry is integral to Climacus’ view of what 
it means to strive for agent’s-awareness. But it is far from evident that this idea entails that 
a thinker can simultaneously occupy the third-person perspective of disinterested 
objectivity and the first-person perspective of unqualified interest in one’s own existence. 
On the contrary, Climacus presents the ‘first’ and ‘second’ moments of double-reflection as 
temporally distinct parts.27 His idea is that, while aiming for objectivity is indeed a proper 
part of ethical inquiry, this aim is always properly superseded by agent’s-awareness. It is 
precisely because the two perspectives exclude each other that we are to suppose that, in 
ethical inquiry, the one perspective must ultimately give way to the other.   
We may conclude that Kierkegaard’s division between objective and subjective 
truth is not to be construed, in sortal terms, as a distinction among kinds or species of truth 
but, rather, on the model of the determinates of a determinable feature. On this model, 
truth itself is the determinable feature of self-coincidence. In empirical inquiry, what 
confers truth is the objectivity of the (relatively) perspective-free perspective; in ethical 
contexts, it is agent’s-awareness. So construed, and provided we are willing to countenance 
a non-propositional conception of truth, it seems to me that Kierkegaard’s ideas can help to 
explain the rational pull we may feel on both sides of the problem whether truth is one or 
many.28 
 
 
 
                                       
27 On the temporal distinctness of the two moments of ‘double-reflection’, see Watts 2011, p. 539. 
28 Warm thanks, for their help with this paper and critical discussion, to David Batho, Clare Carlisle, Niall 
Connelly, Fabian Freyenhagen, Steve Gormley, Béatrice Han-Pile, Jim Levine, John Lippitt, Wayne 
Martin, David McNeil, Vasilis Politis, James Rodwell, Jörg Schaub and Daniel Whiting.   
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